A debate is emerging concerning the use of deception in social science research (especially when it employs experimental methods), driven primarily by the relatively recent move by many economists into experimental work. These economists generally argue that deception should be banned. Deception includes a variety of practices in social science research and is not limited to experimental research. Most often it involves providing limited information about the true purpose of the research, omitting information in the instructions to subjects not deemed central to the study but important to the research effort, or giving a "cover story" for the study that does not reveal the actual topic of study. Regardless of type, all deception used in social science research must be approved through protocol review by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in university settings.
As political scientist Wilson (2007:5) notes in a recent essay: "In economics all deception is forbidden. Reviewers are quite adamant on the point and a paper with any deception will be rejected." Thus, if the economists prevail with journals, funding agencies, and universities in their efforts to ban the use of deception, the impact on our capacity to conduct some kinds of research on important intellectual and scientific issues will be large and potentially very negative. Given space constraints we comment on only a few of the relevant issues posed by this debate (e.g. Hertwig and Ortmann 2001) and the aggressive stance of most experimental economists (see also Eckel 2007) . Hertwig and Ortmann (2001:397) argue (as do almost all experimental economists) that deception should generally not be used in social science experimentation not on ethical grounds, but on pragmatic grounds. Deception, it is argued, produces a contaminated subject pool for their use. They contend that this public goods problem should be solved by strong sanctions, not by semi-voluntary mechanisms such as IRB review. Although they acknowledge the need for such review, they believe it to be inadequate and too permissive even by APA (American Psychological Association) standards. While social psychologists and experimental sociologists generally agree that deception should be a last resort and is sometimes unnecessary, there are underlying issues relevant to this debate that need to be discussed. In the space allowed we briefly outline only some of our concerns, providing just a few examples of the major theoretical problems at stake.
As a rule we agree that deception should be limited by necessity, but we do not agree that the use of deception should be sanctioned by nonpublication of papers employing it, nonfunding of proposals for research requiring deception, or any other heavy sanction that imposes one discipline's priorities on others. Important insights into human behavior and decision-making have come from award-winning experiments (some involving deception) that revealed things about ourselves we may not have wished to know, such as our tendency toward obedience to authority, which takes many forms and continues to have devastating effects on human history.
The need for deception under certain circumstances depends in part on one's view of what is driving human decision-making and behavior. Many experimental economists adhere to one primary view of human behavior while social psychologists, sociologists, and even some behavioral economists have a wider range of views that include nonrational, emotional, and heuristic based elements. Some of the alternative methods advocated by economists to avoid the use of deception (such as the "strategy method" in which subjects make decisions on each of a variety of scenarios representing possible choices of the other participants, and are paid according to one of the scenarios actually chosen by another subject) are not valid modes of conducting experiments when investigating these other elements of choice or behavior. Given inconsistencies between the findings obtained with the strategy method and those with the one-shot design (eg., Blount and Bazerman 1996; Brandt and Charness 2000; Brosig, Weimann, and Yang 2003; Güth, Huck, and Müller 2001; Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen 2004) , the validity of the strategy method is dubious, especially when the behavior under investigation involves emotional or cue-driven, automatic behavior.
The use of various methods to eliminate deception may greatly influence the findings of the studies using such methods depending on the particular avoidant technique. For example, experiments conducted by Horita and Yamagishi (2007a, b) indicate that the rejection rates of unfair offers in ultimatum games was 68% using the strategy method, but around 35% in experiments in which responders actually face an offer from another subject. Horita (2008) replicated this reduction in rejection rates in the ultimatum game (68% to 49%), and further found that this reduction did not occur in the impunity game (33% to 34%). In addition, some manipulations such as the effect of intention on third-party punishment in the third-party punishment game had an effect with the strategy method (Takagishi, Takahashi, and Yamagishi, in press) but was greatly reduced and not significant in one-shot games (Takahashi and Mashima 2005) . Unless we compare the two methods, we are unable to know if a specific finding is unique to the use of a particular method. Independent of whether one view of human decision-making and behavior is correct, the ban on deception makes it impossible or extremely difficult to investigate the nonrational aspects of behavior. They are ruled out by design.
As another example, most psychologists share the view that human information-processing cannot be accessed consciously; it is a nonconscious, often cue-driven, automatic process. An older study of aggression demonstrates this point. Ohira (1989) studied aggression using procedures based on the wellknown tradition of Stanley Milgram (1974) , ironically one of the experiments that first caused concern over deception. 1 Ohira's subjects were greeted by an unpleasant confederate while waiting for an experiment to begin. They were assigned the role of a teacher and instructed to deliver electric shocks to the confederate, who was asked to play the role of a student engaged in learning a word-association task. Ohira measured how aggressive his subjects were toward this confederate by observing the severity of the shocks they delivered to him when he made errors on the learning task, as in the original Milgram study. Ohira used this classic paradigm to study whether providing a justifiable reason for the unpleasant behavior mitigated aggression toward the confederate. He found that it did.
Could we investigate the mitigating effect of information without either imposing suffering on the subject (the target of aggression) or using deception and letting the subject believe the suffering of the target is real? Among economists who might become interested in the study of aggression (or, punishment), the favorite alternative method for overcoming the difficulties inherent in this example involves altering the context and using responses to the allocation of money as the main focus of study. A good example is the use of the ultimatum game, in which one of two players proposes a division of a fixed sum of money with 1 In fact Milgram's early work was one of the experimental paradigms that raised concerns over the use of deception in social psychology and, as a result, is a major reason for the imposition of IRB reviews. The other major source of such reviews occurred, of course, in medical schools where the failure to inform subjects of the potential harms that might occur as a result of their inclusion in a particular clinical trial (e.g. for a new medical procedure or drug test) was especially problematic.
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University of Basel Thu, 02 Oct 2008 13:13:14 another player (the recipient). The recipient decides whether to accept the offer. When the recipient rejects the offer, neither party gets anything. When the proposer's offer is unfair, the recipient gets angry and punishes the proposer (i.e. uses a form of aggression) by rejecting his offer. When it was made clear that the proposer did not intentionally choose the unfair offer (cf. Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003) , the receiver's aggression was greatly reduced and fewer offers were rejected. No deception is involved in this version of the study of aggression.
A real theoretical challenge arises if only the research design using no deception is allowed. Ohira (1989) actually manipulated when the reason for the unpleasant behavior of the confederate was revealed-before the subject faced the confederate or after. He used two measures of aggression-frequency of delivering shocks (how many times the subject pushed the button) and duration of the shocks (how long the subject pushed the button on each trial). The subject who sympathizes with the confederate typically refrains from displaying anger. This should reduce the frequency of delivering shocks. However, the subject's conscious attention is not directed toward duration. The mitigating information will fail to reduce the duration of the button-pushing when he meets the confederate before being exposed to this information. This implies that the confederate had already angered him when he was given the reason for his behavior. In contrast, subjects who knew the reason beforehand were not angered by the confederate. The results were consistent with this reasoning. When mitigating information was revealed after the subject met the confederate, the frequency of delivering an electric shock was reduced, but the duration was not. He behaved aggressively without knowing it. When the information was revealed beforehand, both shock frequency and duration were reduced.
These results suggest that an angry person can control his aggression insofar as he perceives his behavior as aggression; however, he may unwittingly behave aggressively in ways that escape conscious attention. Since there are many ways in which people behave aggressively without realizing it, this is an important finding not only for social scientists, but also for the scientific community at large. Is there an alternative method by which this important lesson could be learned? Certainly, Falk and his colleagues could introduce the same manipulation in their truncated ultimatum game, by revealing the pair of alternatives provided to the proposer before or after the responder receives the offer. But, how can this manipulation be used with the strategy method? Subjects are asked to decide whether to accept or reject each of a possible range of offers. Once the fact that the proposer does not have freedom of choice is revealed to the subject after the first offer, it is known before all subsequent offers are made as well. The post-offer manipulation of the reason cannot be accomplished using the strategy method; the investigator has to use a one-shot game to fulfill the purpose of this study.
In addition to the fact that the strategy method will not work for this type of study, the remaining challenge is to find a way to measure aggression that is not controlled consciously by the responder. Accepting or rejecting an offer cannot escape conscious assessment of the incentives and the situation. The use of physiological measures such as heart rate, skin conductance response, blood pressure, or brain imaging does not provide a solution, because these measures show that the subject is experiencing an emotion, but do not provide evidence that the subject is behaving aggressively (i.e., does in fact impose a cost on the target). Use of the ultimatum game does not allow for the explicit investigation of nonconscious aggression. Such results are likely to lead to a universal theory of aggression characterizing it as a matter of the conscious appraisal of incentives and situations. Aspects of aggression falling outside this narrow range of factors would not easily be studied scientifically if there were a ban on deception. This is a high price to pay when such procedures have been used for decades in the other social sciences responsibly and usefully (particularly since the advent of stringent IRB review).
Economists may concede that this is one of the very rare situations in which the use of Delivered by Ingenta to :
University of Basel Thu, 02 Oct 2008 13:13:14 deception is absolutely necessary: we disagree. The design of the experiments used by many experimental economists typically presupposes conscious decision-making. Insofar as researchers deal with conscious decisionmaking, deception is primarily a matter of economic (i.e. pragmatic) concerns, not of necessity. Once researchers move away from studying conscious decision-making, however, to study nonconscious and automatic behavior (among other things), deception may become an indispensable part of the method of inquiry, as is much more common in psychology and sociological social psychology.
In considering the difficult issues relevant to the use of deception in social science experimentation of how to define "absolute necessity" and "on what grounds," a major dilemma thus emerges. Many economists stand primarily on the ground of conscious and rational decision-making. On this basis, much of the deception actually used by psychologists and sociological social psychologists can be avoided by the use of alternative methodologies, potentially equivalent in effect, though this needs to be demonstrated empirically as Hertwig and Ortmann 2001 suggest. Psychologists and some sociological social psychologists, on the other hand, stand primarily on the ground of nonconscious and automatic information-processing and often investigate nonrational explanations of behavior. On this ground, most of the methodological alternatives proposed by economists are insufficient. Sociological social psychologists, for example, in their studies of the effects of labeling (e.g. labeling an act as "deviant") and expectations for behavior, have demonstrated how powerful simple expectations can be in determining behavior (such as social influence, conformity, self evaluations of performance, and even actual performance in the case of stereotype threat, etc.). Given these major differences in perspective and requirements for testing theory, how can social scientists ever agree on what constitutes "absolute necessity" for the use of deception in social science experiments? Such decisions are best left to peer review such as is common in the IRB review process.
We suggest that "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's" might provide a solution to this conundrum. According to this maxim, psychologists and sociological social psychologists would decide what is absolutely necessary for them, and economists would do so as well. While this rule might provide a solution for the psychologists and sociologists who use experimental methods, since they could continue business as usual, it would not provide a solution to the practical problem of "pollution" (i.e. the public-goods problem of a "tainted" subject pool).
2 As in real world pollution problems, restraining efforts imposed by one group (e.g. economists) on themselves are not sufficient to prevent pollution from spreading from another group of practitioners who do not fully ban deception (e.g. psychologists or sociologists). The negative consequences of "polluted" subjects who are suspicious about deception in any experiment can be much stronger for economists, whose focus is generally on conscious decision-making, than for psychologists or sociological social psychologists, who often study non-conscious and automatic behavior or more social determinants of behavior (e.g. status characteristics, power differences, stereotype threat, group size, network density, etc.). Social psychologists and other social scientists who use deception might continue to pollute the subject pool since they are not affected as much by this "pollution" as the economists would be. This situation is what the economists are trying to avoid by taking the "high" road, though they do so on pragmatic, not ethical grounds. We see a real dilemma and a clear conflict of interest here. When such a conflict of interest is involved, a mutual compromise must be reached, rather than the unilateral declaration of "just" practices to be imposed on all social scientists by one subset of experimentalists on stated pragmatic grounds alone. It is important to note that this debate has a 2 Note there are other solutions currently being proposed which may help in a different way. There are efforts in many universities to expand the pool of potential subjects beyond those on specific campuses to include new subject populations accessible either through the use of technology or by expanding the schools involved in local areas.
University of Basel Thu, 02 Oct 2008 13:13:14 long history within psychology and sociological social psychology, which resulted in the imposition of IRB review boards in the 1970s (post-Milgram). The economists were not part of this debate since at that time experimental economics was barely in its infancy and economists had not yet realized that they might need to use subjects in their own research.
Mutual understanding on the part of economists and social psychologists of the goals of any particular study and the intellectual foundations of each discipline is the first step toward a reasonable and mutually beneficial compromise. We hope the current debate in Social Psychology Quarterly provides a first move in this direction. At a minimum, there must be a broader debate and discussion of the benefits and costs of various research practices (not limited to deception) that fully accounts for the scientific consequences of the imposition of discipline-specific research practices and priorities on others.
If the economists wanted to enforce their mutually agreed on rules of research practice within their own tribe, we would not criticize their academic imperialism. However, they want a much broader ban on deception. For example, hypothetically a manuscript submitted to a general scientific journal (such as the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science-PNAS) by someone who studies heuristic decision-making and uses justifiable deception (from his or her point of view and that of the relevant IRB), when reviewed by economists may be rejected primarily based on the fact that deception was used (and in this case, the journal is not an economic journal). Similarly, economists who review experimental work for granting agencies, including some foundations, raise this point in an effort to impose their standards of research (or rules of the game) on experimentalists in other socialscience disciplines.
3 Efforts to conduct research that might produce findings that are inconsistent with the economists' typical view of human decision-making and choice are thus denied (since either the article based on such research is rejected or the proposal is not funded). If allowed to continue (or to take hold as a general ban on deception), the consequences extend far beyond the simple pragmatic issues described in current debates. In practice conscious modes of decision-making, judgment, and behavior would be the primary focus of investigation. A ban would rule out discovery or even investigation of the unconscious foundations of behavior providing support for one particular view of decision-making by fiat. This would be the most troublesome consequence of the wholesale ban on deception in social science. Capitulation to the "pragmatic and not ethical concerns" of the economists would indeed be very costly for scientific inquiry.
Efforts to compromise must come from all sides. Psychologists and sociological social psychologists (the primary constituents) should think twice before convincing themselves that deception is absolutely necessary in a particular study (and our IRBs could scrutinize such requests even more carefully). As some economists suggest, much of the deception used by psychologists and sociologists is not absolutely necessary, which was indeed the case in the earliest days of experimental social psychology. Economists could also attempt to understand more fully the reasons for deception in the research conducted by social psychologists and other social scientists. Hertwig and Ortmann call for more research into the effects of deception on research findings. This is likely to be useful for various purposes, but the primary focus of such research should not be to support a general ban on deception. There are many research practices that may have empirical effects and the study of such methodological "artifacts", as in the early study of experimenter effects, is potentially useful, but it should be driven by deeper theoretical inquiries into the determinants of human social behavior.
One additional byproduct (and not the only one) of the ban on deception would have clear ethical and pragmatic consequences not yet considered by the economists engaged in 3 Both of the authors of this essay are familiar with actual examples of manuscripts being rejected on these grounds and for major revisions being required (often involving the waste of subject and investigator time) to avoid deception in the proposed research as a condition for awarding funds.
University of Basel Thu, 02 Oct 2008 13:13:14 this debate. This issue involves the waste of time and effort on the part of many subjects that would be required by a complete ban on deception. For example, if we wanted to study the rates of rejection of an allocation that overrewards a recipient in the ultimatum game and we were required to avoid deception, we would have to run a large number of subjects to obtain enough cases of overreward to investigate. Overreward might only occur about 10% of the time. In addition, we would need to include the same number of proposers as responders since we would not be able to have the responders reply to a computerized participant. In this example of an ultimatum game, a proposer might offer to split 100 dollars, giving 80 to a recipient and keeping 20-a case of overreward. Since we are only interested theoretically in the recipient's response, not in the proposer's allocation decision, we do not need much of the data that would be collected. These extra subjects would be invited to participate in the experiment only to provide a façade; their presence does not contribute to the acquisition of scientific knowledge given the purpose of the study. We see serious problems with the requirement for nondeception in cases like this on two grounds (one pragmatic, the other ethical). First, it is likely that one would have to include many more subjects than needed in the study simply to meet the requirements for studying the phenomenon of interest (which is a rare occurrence) and much of the data would be unused, given the primary focus on the recipients' replies, not the allocators' behavior.
Second, allowing the overwhelming majority of the subjects to believe they were not providing useful knowledge creates a different kind of ethical dilemma (potentially more problematic than simple deception would create). Using subject time for no clear scientific reason is hard to justify on ethical grounds. The practice of nondeception as in this example runs the risk of creating a different kind of "pollution" in the potential subject pool for social-science investigators-that of the subject whose time has been wasted to preserve the notion that no deception is ever used. The perception that their data were not used might cause subjects to question the utility of future studies of which they may be a part, and this would cause a problem for those psychologists and sociologists who depend on volunteer subjects rather than on paid subjects. (We have not even examined here the additional waste of time this policy would create for research assistants and investigators, as well as a waste of some of the funds provided by agencies with limited resources to support social-science research of any kind). We definitely need a fuller debate of the complex set of issues involved, as well as concerted effort to study the possible negative consequences of deception and of the potential waste of subject time and resources. As Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) suggest, research of this type is needed so that decisions can be evidence-based rather than based on ideology, simple pragmatics, overly simplified ethics, or expedience. But the research agenda should be broadened to incorporate other methodological issues regarding aspects of research design as they relate to the broad range of underlying determinants of behavior.
Efforts to seek a reasonable and productive compromise should also come from relevant economists. We urge them not to take unilateral action and instead accept the fact that the definition of "absolute" necessity depends deeply on the goal of the investigation. Once psychologists and sociologists recommit to avoiding unnecessary deception whenever possible (adjudicated by representative IRB committees) and experimental economists abandon their recent efforts to unilaterally impose their requirements on other social scientists, the door is open for earnest compromise.
